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ABSTRACT 
This paper reexamines a topic that has been much studied by 
economists--estimating the effects on resource allocation of the 
economic regulation of surface freight transport, It demonstrates 
that in several studies the methods used to estimate the welfare costs 
of rate regulation are invalid, develops a correct procedure, and 
provides estimates of the welfare effects using data and estimates of 
modal market share relationships from a study by Boyer. The paper 
also analyzes some implications of an important assumption that is 
common among studies of the transportation sector. The assumption is 
that the total quantity of freight shipments by all modes is invariant 
with respect to tariff levels. 
THE REGULAT ION OF S U RF A C E  FREIGHT TRANSPORTAT ION:
THE WELF A R E  EFFECTS REVISITED 
Ronald R. Braeutigam and Roger G. Noll• 
Numerous studies have addressed the problem of estimating the 
costs of resource misallocation due to the regulation of surface 
freight transportation.1 Regulation creates inefficiency to the 
extent that it does not systemmatically relate prices to marginal 
costs. The theoretically correct method for estimating this 
inefficiency is to measure the loss in total surplus arising from the 
regulator's pricing policy. 
Most of the early studies of the effects of regulation in this 
industry did not use this method, instead using the "comparative cost" 
approach. The latter assumes that modes are perfect substitutes. The 
cost of regulation is then estimated as the difference in shipping 
costs between the mode by which shipments are transported and the 
marginal cost of shipments by the lowest cost mode. 
More recent studies have used estimates of cross elasticities 
of demand to take account of the fact that most shippers do not regard 
transportation modes as perfect substitutes. Unfortunately, each of 
these studies adopts an approach that is not in general theoretically 
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correct and that is likely to produce a biased estimate, This paper 
examines the methods that have been used, and uses the data and 
econometric results in one paper, Boyer (1977) ,  to calculate the 
magnitude of this bias. As is customary in these studies, we are 
ignoring other costs of regulation, such as on the costs of service 
(see, for example, Douglas and Miller (1974) ) or of the process 
itself. Section I derives the theoretically correct method for 
2 
estimating the welfare effects of surface freight regulation and shows 
how it differs from the methods actually used in other studies, It 
identifies two methodological problems in other studies: incorrect 
accounting for intermodal effects in calculating total surplus, and 
the assumption in most studies that the demand for total 
transportation shipments is perfectly inelastic with respect to all 
prices, Sections I I  and I I I  estimate the empirical significance of 
these methodological problems. In both cases, these problems are 
found to cause serious underestimates of the cost of regulation using 
Boyer' s data, 
I. WELF A R E  MEASURllMENT IN INTERRELATED MARKETS 
i 
Let the tariffs for transporting a commodity be pi for mode i, 
1,2. The demand schedules for the two modes are assumed to be 
interdependent, and are written as xi (p1,p2) ,  Let the marginal cost 
of transport service by mode i be a constant c . •2 Assuming that 
1 
deregulation will lead to prices equal to marginal costs, the problem 
is to estimate the welfare effects of moving prices from (p1, p2) to 
3 
If income effects are zero, a measure of the sum of consumer 
and producer surplus (e.g. total surplus) associated with the set of 
tariffs (p �,p�) can be written (suppressing the argument of the demand 
schedules in the integral) as: 
' , ,, '') over any path r that connects (p1,p2) with (p1,p2 , where 
,, ,, the tariffs (p1,p2) . 
, , The independence of T (p1,p2) on the path of 
4 integration follows from the assumption of zero income effects. 
(1) 
The change in total surplus that would result from a movement 
, , of tariffs from (p1,p2) to marginal costs (c1,c2) can be written as: 
I I 
(2) 
where r is any path from (c1,c2) to (p1,p2) .  Some possible paths of
integration are shown in Figure 1. The AT obtained in this process is 
the gain in total surplus that would result if marginal cost pricing 
I I 
were used instead of the tariffs (p1,p2) .
Suppose we want t o  estimate the welfare effects associated 
with moving one of these tariffs (say, pl) from its regulated level 
(p�) to marginal cost (c1) .  Assume that under regulation in neither 
mode does price equal marginal cost (i,e, ,  pi I ci' for i = 1,2) . 
way to estimate these welfare effects is to evaluate the expression 
One 
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from P1 to c1 and the second tariff remains at p2 + c2• In this case 
the welfare effects of mode 1 regulation cannot be evaluated without 
information about the change in the demand for mode 2 service that 
would occur as a result of the change in the first tariff. The effect 
of a differential change in p1 on T is estimated by: 
by: 
Using a linear approximation of demand, (3) is approximated 
1 , , , , 
AT1 � 2-(p1-c1)[x1 (c1,p2) - x1<P1•P2) ]
I I I I 
+ (p2-c2) [x2 (p1,p2) - x2 (c1,p2) ]  
(3) 
(4) 
The first term on the right hand side of (4) is the dead weight 
loss triangle, computed using the Marshallian demand for x1, evaluated 
I 
at p2• With constant marginal costs, the second term corresponds to 
the change in profits for mode 2 resulting from the change in that 
, 
mode' s traffic when the tariff in mode 1 is moved from p1 to c1• The 
total surplus change is thus depicted in Figure 2. The change in 
total surplus is the shaded area ABD minus the shaded area EFGH,
approximated by (4). This corresponds to the vertical part of Path 2 
in Figure 1. 
To estimate the change in total surplus associated with moving 
both tariffs to marginal cost, Path 2 (Figure 1) must be completed by 
integrating its horizontal portion, The welfare effect of a 
FIGURE 2 
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differential change in p2, holding p1 constant, is: 
(5) 
On the horizontal segment of Path 2, pl = c1, so that the first term 
of (5) is zero, The second term is estimated as: 
(6) 
Equation (6) is the usual dead weight loss triangle, computed using 
the Marshallian demand schedule x2, evaluated at p1 = c1, This is 
depicted in Figure 3 as the shaded area IJK, which, when added to area 
ABD minus EFGH in Figure 2, approximates the total surplus gain that 
could be realized if marginal cost pricing were used instead of the 
regulated tariffs, Total surplus is maximized with marginal cost 
pricing, so that area ABD plus area IJK minus area EFGH must be 
nonnegative (area ABD minus area EFGH may be negative). 
As an alternative to the use of Marshallian demand schedules, 
it is also possible to employ mutatis mutandis demand schedules (in 
which both prices vary simultaneously), shown by Path 1 in Figure 1. 
By integrating along Path 1, the welfare loss from regulation can be 
estimated as: 
1 I I I 
AT= 2£x1<c1,c2> - x1<P1•P2)][p1-c1] 
1 , , , 
+ 2£x2<c1,c2>-x2<P1•P2)](p2-c2) 
(7) 
The method of (7) is an alternative to summing the estimates from (4) 
and (6), If the demand equations are correctly specified as linear, 
FIGURE 3 
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both methods will produce the same estimate of the change in surplus. 
In practice, if nonlinear demand relationships are approximated by 
linear ones, the methods will produce different estimates. In Section 
I I  these methods are compared using Boyer's ·data. 
A surprisingly common practice in transportation studies is to 
overlook some of the components of total surplus. Indeed, only Levin 
(1978) uses a theoretically correct path of integration; however he 
also assumes that truck prices are set at marginal cost, so that the 
effects of changes in rail tariffs can be calculated without 
considering secondary effects in trucking. He does correctly account 
for interaction effects between two other modes, rail and piggyback, 
by appropriate use of (7). 
Boyer attempts to use the method depicted by Path 2, but 
ignores the effects of railroad deregulation on trucking profits in 
calculating the first step. Friedlaender (1969) and Keeler (1976) 
adopt an approach closer to Path 1; however they base their 
calculations solely on own price-elasticities, thereby implicitly 
I 
calculating the quantity changes in mode i by using p
j 
instead of c
j 
in the demand functions, xi (pi, pj), in equation (7). 
Friedlaender and Spady (1980) recognize that the position of 
the demand curve for one mode is shifted by a change in price in the 
other mode. They make two estimates of the sum of the dead weight 
loss triangles associated with prices above marginal costs, one with 
the other mode price set at marginal cost. Neither method is correct, 
I I 
for neither defines a continuous path in Figure 1 from (p1, p2) to 
10 
Spann and Erickson (1970), and Zerbe (1980) in commenting on 
their work, do the same thing in calculating the welfare effects of 
the combined short-haul and long-haul rate changes instituted when the 
ICC was organized, thereby implicitly assuming a zero long-run cross-
elasticity of demand between long-haul and short-haul shipments. As 
Zerbe points out, Spann and Erickson also ignore part of the effect on 
profits from price and quantity changes in the same market. 
Moore (1975) bases his estimates on constant-elasticity demand 
equations that have both direct- and cross-elasticity terms, He 
proceeds by calculating the effect on surplus from first lowering 
truck prices to marginal costs, then lowering rail rates so that total 
rail shipments are left at their initial amount, and then calculating 
the extra surplus in trucking that arises from an increase in truck 
shipments at lower prices, To this he then adds the estimates of 
excess costs due to shipping by the wrong mode, as estimated by 
Harbeson (1969) and Peck (1965) , on the assumption that if rail rates 
were lowered further to marginal cost these shipments would switch 
modes, This is methodologically invalid as well. Let mode 1 be rails 
and mode 2 be trucks, After embarking on the first segment of Path 3 
, , . . 
in Figure 1 from (p1, p2) to (p1, c2) ,  where (p1, c2) leaves total 
rail shipments unchanged, Moore should use the same demand equation to 
• 
estimate the further surplus from (p1, c2) to (c1, c2) ,  His procedure 
is correct only if: (1) as he points out, no new traffic is created 
by the second reduction in rail prices; (2) only "old" truck traffic, 
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and no "new'' traffic generated by the fall in truck prices switches 
modes when rail rates are lowered to marginal costs; and (3) the 
nature of the cross-elasticity of demand is such that all of the truck 
• 
traffic that will switch to rails will do so at rail rates of p1 - €, 
All three of these conditions are inconsistent with the estimated 
demand functions used by Moore to calculate the welfare changes from 
moving along the first part of the path he uses, 
Another common error is to try to determine how much of the 
total surplus change should be attributed to each mode if both tariffs 
are changed to marginal costs, For example, in one of his 
calculations, Boyer attempted to separate the welfare effects by mode 
(see his footnote 10), First, he calculates the welfare gain from 
railroad deregulation by holding truck prices fixed, Then, he 
calculates the gains from truck deregulation, given the new rail 
prices, This procedure is faulty because no such unique measure 
exists, For example, in Figure 1, a path of integration that changed 
, , , 
p2 first, moving from (p1, p2) to (p1, c2) to (c1, c2) ,  would normally 
produce a different "allocatiod' of the welfare gains between modes 
than an integration along Path 2 would yield, even though the totals 
would be the same in the absence of errors of approximation, In 
general, the line integral is a function of rate changes in both 
modes, and cannot be written separably to ascribe a unique and 
meaningful change in surplus to either mode individually. 
A final source of error in other studies is the common 
assumption that total freight shipments are unaffected by tariffs, 
The comparative cost studies estimate the costs of regulation by 
reallocating actual shipments in a given year according to marginal 
costs and multiplying the amounts of shipments reallocated by the 
differences in costs between the modes, Boyer and Levin employ a 
logit model to estimate the market share of each mode, given tariffs 
in all modes. The quantity of shipments by mode are then calculated 
by multiplying these shares by the actual quantity of shipments in a 
12 
given year, This obviously ignores any business gained or lost by the 
transportation sector as a result of a change in prices to equal 
marginal costs; in (7), Ax1 must be equal in magnitude and opposite in 
sign to Ax2, (For other problems with this use of logit, see Oum 
(1979) ,) 
The assumption of perfectly inelastic total demand affect s  the 
estimated welfare effects of price changes, It does so by its effects 
on the estimate of the quantity effects of price changes, 
The quantity to be shipped by mode 1 is defined to be the 
share of the market shipped by that mode times the total quantity 
shipped by both modes, 
(8) 
Thus, a change in pl can be expected to affect xi as follows: 
(9) 
If the total ton miles of freight shipped by both modes is 
, assumed to be constant, the second term of (9) will be zero by 
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assumption In reality, if pl drops while p2 is 
unchanged, one would expect the sign of the second term to be 
negative, since shippers might demand more transportation when one 
tariff is lowered, Moreover, the data used to estimate the modal 
split equation will be from various markets with different tariffs. 
llence the parameters estimated in the modal split equation will 
incorporate both market-elasticity and cross-elasticity effects into a 
model that explicitly accounts for only the latter, The predicted 
share of a mode after a price decrease will be a share of a quantity 
that reflects both elasticity effects; however the (smaller) initial 
quantity will be multiplied by this new estimated share to determine 
the new quantity shipped by the same mode, 
Thus, the inelasticity assumption will lead to an 
understatement of the effects of a change in pl on x1 and to an
overestim!lte of the extent to which mode 2 will be affected by a 
change in p1. Further, in each case the magnitude of the effect will 
be most significant when the market share of the corresponding mode is 
large. This is apparent from (8) , in which Si is the coefficient on 
the quantity effect that is assumed to be zero. 
How does the inelasticity assumption affect the estimates of 
the change in welfare resulting from movements of tariffs in both 
markets to marginal costs? To answer this question, we analyze the 
effects of the inelasticity assumption using tl1e method of calculation 
of (7). Consider an estimation of the change in xi that would result 
from a movement of both tariffs from their regulated levels to 
marginal cost, An approximation of this change, (Axi)•, without the 
inelasticity assumption can be written as: 
14 
i 1,2. (10) 
I I 
For notational convenience, let x1 + x2 
(10) can be rewritten: 
Q at (p1,p2)), Using (8), 
i 1,2 (11) 
From (7) , the change in total surplus, AT•, without the 
inelasticity assumption from moving both tariffs to marginal costs is 
approximately: 
(12) 
Finally, after some algebra, AT• can be approximated as: 
(13) 
The first term on the right hand side of (13) would be the 
welfare change estimated if the inelasticity assumption were valid, 
Denote this term by A Te. The bias introduced if the inelasticity 
assumption is invalid is captured by the second term on the right hand 
side of (13),  which is denoted by&, Note that if the inelasticity 
assum t. . lid � 0 b Q!l... • p 1on 1s va , u = ecause a 1s zero, pi 
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The sign of & must be positive whenever both regulated tariffs 
depart from marginal costs in the same direction, because in either 
case both of the bracketed components of & are of the same sign, 
Thus, a larger estimate of the welfare effects of regulation would be 
expected if the inelasticity assumption were not imposed, The sign of 
& cannot be determined purely theoretically if the regulated tariff 
exceeds marginal cost in one market, but is less than marginal cost in 
the other, for then the two bracketed components of & may or may not 
have the same sign, 
I I, THE EFFECTS OF INVAL ID PATIIS OF INTEGRAT ION 
In this section, the data and demand equations presented by 
Boyer are used to recalculate the welfare effects of regulation in 
1963 along a valid path of integration, The approximations in both 
equation (7) and equations (4) and (6) are used, The results of these 
calculations are shown in Table 1, 
The demand equation that Boyer used to calculate welfare 
effects was as follows:5 
where 
i 
A ln :� • -4.15 [(:�) ' - ��) 
b
] 
(14) 
a modal index, 1 for rail, 2 for motor carriers 
the share of traffic for mode i, where sl + s2 = 1 
the tariff for mode i 
16 
TABLE 1 
WELFARE CALCULATIONS 
Mileage sl at ¢/Ton·Mile 1963 Ton•Miles s1 at 6W4 from s1 at 6W6 from 6W4+6W6 6W7 from Boyer's w rail 
p' I . <cl' Pz>'Block (pl ,pZ) 1 P2 cl c2 of Traffic (billions) Eq ( 4) , $mil. (cl,c2) Eq (6) ,$mil. $ mil. Eq (7) ,$mil. $ mil. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
25 0.35 6.14 19.84 6.64 18.56 2.63 0.33 1.0 0.31 0.3 1. 3 0.9 n.c. 
75 0.36 3.21 10.41 2.97 8.45 7.51 0.38 -3.0 o. 32 4.6 1.6 2.6 n.c. 
150 0.50 2.69 6.88 2.00 5.94 21.09 0.60 -12.9 0.56 4.3 -8.6 -1.6 4.4 
250 0.55 2.23 4.97 1.61 5.17 26.92 0,68 17.8 0.69 0.3 18.1 14.3 10.8* 
350 0,60 2.11 4.00 1.44 4.96 17.62 o. 75 34.7 0,80 4.1 38.8 28.7 11.8 
450 0,66 2.05 3.98 1.37 4.86 22.32 0,80 37.5 0.81 0.7 38.2 31.3 13. 7 
550 0.68 2.11 3.99 1.29 4. 81 22.05 0.83 41.5 0,86 2.4 43.9 32.5 16.3 
700 o. 71 1.87 3.45 1.24 4. 73 40.01 0.84 82.8 0.89 :1-2. 8 95.6 68.8 22.7 
900 o. 76 1. 71 3.24 1.18 4.68 33.15 0.86 57 .o 0.91 11. 7 68.7 49.0 13.2 
1100 o. 79 1. 74 3.23 1.16 4.65 18.93 0,89 31.6 0.93 5.6 37.2 34.2 7.7 
1350 0.83 1. 75 2.59 1.13 4.62 21.03 0.93 49.2 0,96 6,4 55.6 36.2 8.5 
1750 0.86 1.68 2.47 1.11 4.59 39.30 0.94 76.2 0.97 12.1 88.3 58.1 12.3* 
Total 413.4 65,3 478.7 355.0 121.4* 
Sources: Col. 2 from Boyer (Table 4, column 9) 
Col. 3 from Boyer (Table 4' column 5) 
Col. 4 from Boyer (Table 4, column 6) 
Col. 5 from Boyer (Table 4, column 2) 
Col. 6 from Boyer (Table 4, column 3) 
Col. 7 from Boyer (Table 4. column 8) 
Cols. 8 - 13, calculated as described in text 
Col. 14 from Boyer (Table 4, column 11), where n.c. means not calculcated and (*) means correction of Boyer's reported numbers using his 
methodology and data. 
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b denotes the situation before tariffs are changed 
a denotes the situation after tariffs are changed. 
The entries in Table 1 are calculated as follows, Column 2 
shows the rail market share at regulated rates for each mileage block, 
, , 
If the rail rate is changed from pl to c1, holding Pz equal to Pz• a 
new rail share can be estimated from (14). The welfare change 
associated with the rail rate change (with no change in the motor 
carrier rate) is calculated from (4) and reported as AW4 in column 9. 
Thus, AW4 provides one estimate of the effects of rail rate 
regulation, given unchanged motor carrier regulation. The estimated 
welfare effect of railroad regulation is 8413.4 million, which is much 
larger than Boyer's estimate (column 14). 
To complete the estimate of the welfare effects of regulation 
for both modes, we carry out the calculation of equation (6), reported 
as AW6 in column 11 of Table l, Once again we employ equation (16) to 
calculate the market shares when both modes are priced at marginal 
cost.6 Column 11 is the incremental gain from deregulating trucks, 
given that railroads have been deregulated, and is estimated by 
calculating the dead weight loss triangle from prices differing from 
marginal cost in trucking. The total welfare effect of regulation, 
the sum of column 9 and 11 (shown in column 12),7 is 8478.7 million, 
In column 13 we use the mutatis mutandis demand schedules of 
equation (7) to calculate an alternative estimate of the welfare loss 
from regulation. This estimate is 8355 million, 
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Boyer's estimate of the total cost of regulation is much less 
than either of ours. The source of the difference is that he 
overlooks the effect of railroad deregulation on truck prof its. This 
biases his result downward because, according to his data, truck 
prices are below marginal cost for long-distance shipping, so that 
truck profits increase if they lose market share in these mileage 
blocks, This we view as highly implausible, although we use his data 
in our calculations to compare our welfare estimates with his. 
The difference in our two estimates arises from the error 
introduced by using a linear approximation to the nonlinear demand 
curve (14) , ' f for The term (pi - ci) is as much as 35 percent o pi 
rails and 80 percent for trucks in some mileage blocks. Thus, it is 
stretching matters to regard the change in tariffs as "small" for 
purposes of approximation, 
I I I, TIIE EFFECTS OF T H E  INELAS T IC DEMAND A S SUMPT ION 
This section explores the empirical significance of the 
assumption that the total market demand for surface freight 
transportation is perfectly inelastic with respect to all tariffs , 
Direct estimation of the effects of this assumption would require 
econometric estimates of properly specified modal demand equations 
that, among other things, included the tariffs for all modes in the 
demand equation of each, We have not attempted this. Instead, we 
d t est1'mate the sensitivity of his estimates of have used Boyer's ata o 
welfare loss to alternative assumptions about the price elasticity of 
19 
market demand, Consider two effects on shipments in mode i due to a 
change in its price, pi: the change in mode i's share of total 
shipping, and the change in mode i's shipments owing to a change in 
total shipping, Let s be the proportionality factor between these 
quantities: 
(15) 
The right-hand side of (15) can be substituted for the term � in pi 
(13), and the data in Table 1 can then be used to estimate the change 
in surplus as a function of s, 
Of course, s is closely related to the elasticity of total 
shipments with respect to a change in modal prices, If both sides of 
(15) are divided by the ratio of Q to Pi' the result is:
where 
ei is 
lie in 
eis is the elasticity of mode i's share with respect 
the elasticity of total demand with respect to pi' 
Values of Si eis 
the range -,2 to 
can 
-.5 
be calculated from Table 1, and 
for rails, and between -,05 and 
(16) 
to pi and 
tend to 
-,3 for 
trucks, Thus, if ei were -,1 (e,g, a ten percent change in pi causes 
a one percent net change in total shipments), s would fall in the 
range of ,2 to ,4 for rails and between .3 and 2,5 for trucks, 
Alternatively, a value of s of unity implies a value of ei of about 
-.35, These values are roughly consistent with the elasticities 
reported by Moore, 8 
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We have calculated the value of the last term in (13)�the 
magnitude of the bias from overlooking the net increments to shipping 
from a change in modal prices--using Boyer's data, The results are 
shown in Table 2, If for each mileage block one selects a value of s 
that makes ei equal to -.1, the estimated welfare gain from marginal 
cost pricing increases by approximately $15 million (column (3)), If 
instead a value of s equal to unity is applied for all calculations, 
the estimated welfare gain from marginal cost pricing is increased by 
$55 million (column (4) ) ,  These calculations are substantially 
affected by the peculiar feature of Boyer's data that truck prices are 
below marginal costs for most blocks, If regulated truck prices are 
assumed to be equal to marginal cost, and if ei is assumed to be -,1, 
then the additional welfare gain from prices equal to marginal costs 
in rails is g36 million (column (5)), If s is assumed to be unity in 
all blocks, the additional gain is g136 million (column (4)), As is 
apparent from Table 2, these magnitudes are nontrivial fractions of 
Boyer's estimates of the welfare effects of regulation, 
IV, CONCLUSIONS
This paper has investigated methods for estimating the total 
welfare loss from the regulation of surface freight transportation, 
Numerous previous studies have been found to use invalid methods for 
calculating this loss, We have used methodologically correct 
procedures to estimate the welfare loss from regulation, using Boyer's 
data and market share estimation technique, Three principal findings 
TABLE 2 
ADDITIONAL WELFARE EFFECTS IF DEMAND ELASTICITY NONZERO 
(Figure in $millions) 
Mileage Assumption Assumption Assumption Assumption Welfare Estimates at Zero Elasticity 
Block A B c D Path l(llW7) Boyer Rail Only (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
25 0 0 0 0 0.9 n.c 
75 8.2 2.9 1. 3 .5 2.6 n.c 
150 24.3 6.7 7.3 2.0 -1.6 4.4 
250 8.1 l. 2 11.8 2.5 14.3 10.8* 
350 .4 0 10.6 2.2 28.7 11.8 
450 4.7 .4 14.3 3.3 31. 3 13. 7 
550 7.9 l. 3 18.5 4.8 32.5 16.3 
700 -8.0 -.9 24.0 3.6 68.8 22.7 
900 l.O .2 13.3 3.7 49.0 13.2 
1100 l. 7 .6 8.7 2.9 34. 2 7.7 
1350 2.3 • 7 10.7 3.9 36.2 8.5 
1750 3.9 1. 7 15.7 7.1 58.1 12.3* 
TOTAL 54.5 14.8 136.2 36.5 355.0 121.4* 
Assumption A: if mode i changes its price, the resulting change in shipments is equally 
divided into substitution from mode j and a net increment to total traffic 
(s = 1). 
Assumption B: the elasticity of total traffic by all modes with respect to change in 
price in any one mode (ei) is -.1. 
Assumption C: only rail rates change (trucks now priced at marginal cost) and s = 1. 
Assumption D: Same as Assumption C, except er = .1. 
Columns (6) and (7) repeated from Table 1 for convenience. 
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emerge, First, the choice of a correct path of integration increased 
the estimated welfare loss by a factor of three or four, Second, the 
choice of a path of integration substantially affects the estimated 
welfare loss because of the errors introduced by linear approximations 
of nonlinear demand curves over relatively large changes in prices and 
quantities, Third, the assumption that the total quantity of freight 
shipped by all modes is perfectly inelastic caused an underestimate of 
the welfare costs of regulation that is substantial. When the first 
and last effects are accounted for, the estimate of the annual welfare 
loss of surface freight transportation is increased from $121 million 
to upwards of $500 million, 
23 
F 001NOTES 
1. See, for example, Peck (1965), Harbeson (1969) , Friedlaender 
(1969), Woods and Domencich (1971) , Moore (1975), Keeler (1976),
Boyer (1977) , Levin (1978) , and Friedlaender and Spady (1980) , 
2. We are ignoring the problem of fixed costs, or scale economies 
and the possible necessity of a second-best price structure (see
Braeutigam (1979) ) ,
3 ,  Whether railroads will behave a s  perfect competitors i s  a matter 
of some dispute (see Levin (1980) ), 
4. Consumer and producer surplus may still be useful concepts even
if there are nonzero income effects (see Willig (1976)) ,
5 .  This difference equation follows from regression 1 of Boyer' s 
paper, p, 501, 
6. Column 10 in our paper differs from Boyer's predicted market 
shares in column 10, of Table 4, of his paper. We calculated the 
change in market shares in moving from (cl'p2) to (c1,c2) ,  in 
order to avoid the error made by Boyer that is discussed in 
footnote 10 of Levin' s paper, In this case the error had little 
effect on the welfare calculations, For a more detailed 
discussion, see Levin, p, 25. 
7. Each entry in column 12 should be positive, because total surplus 
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should increase when both tariffs are moved to marginal cost. An 
anomalous result (and one that cannot be correct) appears in the 
150 mileage block. This could occur because for this block the 
welfare calculations in this paper may be poor approximations to 
equation (2) in the text, or because there are errors in the 
estimates of the demand structure not explored in this paper. 
8. Moore reports estimates of demand functions for trucks and rails 
that have cross-elasticities of demand of about ,9 for both
modes, and own-price elasticities of -1.8 for trucks and -.9 for 
rails. With about sixty percent of shipments in ton-miles moving 
by rail, this suggests that one-third of the new business 
generated by a reduction in rail tariffs is a net increase in 
total shipment (e.g. s = 0.5), whereas about one-fourth of 
trucking gains from a price reduction would be net new sldpments 
(e.g. s = .33). These estimates are, of course, extremely crude, 
being based on single-equation demand models that aggregate over 
all types of commodities and shipping distances.
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